

The Path towards Strengthened Safeguards: Experiences in Iraq, South Africa, and North Korea

This video series is a collection of dialogues centered on the immense role played by the IAEA, and in particular how the Agency supports nuclear nonproliferation through the practice of safeguards. This current update is a chronicle of events during the 1990s, Iraq, South Africa, and North Korea, that led to the development of the Additional Protocol.

7.10 Importance of 3rd Party Information in Iraq

Keywords: national technical means, Iraqi weapons development document

Rich: As the whole thing developed, and information came to the Action Team, both from the Iraqi side, but also from outside, it was really the first time in the history of the Agency that extensive, of what we now euphemistically refer to as 3rd party information, information from states, intelligence kinds of information, was provided to the Agency to support inspection effort.

Laura: National technical means. Rich: National technical means.

Rich: Could you speak to that a little bit, how it came, how it was used.

Jacques: Yes, the provision of information voluntarily provided by a state has been key as far as the Agency's ability to discover what was the Iraq program. However, I've always called the attention, particularly at the time of the way to war of 2002, there was some communication lines saying that the Agency has not been able to find anything other than what it was able to find from defectors, it had been tremendously important, but probably in terms of the proportion a limited input. What is the tremendous important is example for instance, the famous IAEA 6, and the parking lot event where inspectors were locked in the parking because they didn't want to leave the premises without the documentation they had found. It was definitely an illustration on how effective proper and timely communication between a state having information through national means, and inspectors having the right of access to a site, under 687 of course, could make the difference. I would say one of the key results of these inspections was the famous smoking gun document demonstrating that Iraq had a weapons development program, which they had always denied. And I'm very glad for this document, because that's the reason that I joined the Agency, I mean today, being called as a weapon expert. Before that there was no real need for me.

Laura: Tell us a little bit about the parking lot incident. How did that place get targeted, tell us a little bit more for the people who might not have been there.

Jacques: I wasn't there either. This is one of my great regrets. If I had started 6 months earlier, I could have gone through the Iraq verification regime from the beginning. And maybe I would have been on this famous parking, but I was not.

The Iraqis at the time were in the process of concealing what was the true extent of their program. And given they had already understood the power of 687, and that an inspection team would be able to access any site, and would be able to access then any document that would prove the extent of the program. So they entered a concealment program that included the collection of damning documents and started to move them from one location to another, in order to avoid these documents being reached by the inspectors. It happened, when I say it's an illustration of very timely transmission of information, one of

the temporary locations or two of them were actually leaked from some human source in Iraq, and transferred to the Agency in such a timely manner that when the team reached the sites, the documents were still there. So that's really the mechanism that led to that key event.