

## **The Path towards Strengthened Safeguards: Experiences in Iraq, South Africa, and North Korea**

This video series is a collection of dialogues centered on the immense role played by the IAEA, and in particular how the Agency supports nuclear nonproliferation through the practice of safeguards. This current update is a chronicle of events during the 1990s, Iraq, South Africa, and North Korea, that led to the development of the Additional Protocol.

### **7.17 DPRK**

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Demetrius: While this was going on, other things were – at the same time, North Korea came up. Under the pressure, they were finally ready to go. They'd signed the NPT, and finally in 91 they were ready to ratify their safeguards agreement. So we start all over again. A new country, a little bit suspected of being not quite right. So with Blix a visit happened, together with staff from the Agency and Department of Safeguards, and we find huge buildings, which they called a chemical laboratory, bigger than standard reprocessing plants.

Inspectors are feeling a little uneasy, taking a lot of samples. One thing missed by the North Korean side, is that the Agency, because of Iraq, had suddenly increased tremendously its technical capability. Not only for the first time did we have satellite imagery, not yet commercial, but under the control of the intelligence agencies, and this really helped a lot because now we could assess what things were. But now, more important, we started getting access to the environmental sampling technology, and this definitely helped a lot because not only were we getting information from locations in Iraq, but we were using the smears and samples to that technology to make analysis taken from the chemical lab in DPRK.

Rich: But you know the interesting thing about that is that the Koreans accepted that voluntarily – it wasn't obligatory until 2 years later.

Laura: They didn't know how powerful it was.

Demetrius: It happened so fast, all at the same time, that there was no time to really report all the availability of the technology and the results you could obtain. They didn't know – yeah, you want a sample, sure, you want to take a smear there, sure. They didn't know what we could learn. They found out much later – they learned it with great anguish. For the first time, it led to great friction between the Agency and the member state. That took us to 1992. There's a lot of pressure on Korea to provide access to more facilities, some identified by intelligence, a number were clearly identified by satellite.

By the satellite we could compare what we saw in Korea, with what we saw at a waste facility in Iraq – they were both supplied by Russia, so we could tell what they were. There were a few other problems related to the accuracy of the declaration of Korea, about the facility and Pu, isotopes of Pu, that was the product - they said about a few grams - but what was in waste solutions didn't match. Blix said his famous phrase, "there are two gloves and they don't fit." Something is wrong that has to be explained. There were no explanations.

Long meetings at the political level were held, the Minister of Energy visited here in Vienna, Blix presided over the meetings. Unfortunately, there was no agreement, and so, the Agency was forced for the

first time to ask for a special inspection. The special inspection - Laura knows quite well - it's a standard clause in the NPT type of agreement, but at that time no one was using it, because basically they felt that whoever was going to be under a special inspection was being suspected of something. So there was a reluctance to use this thing. But Blix was obliged to do that. All other political options were gone. The Koreans had withdrawn their anytime - anywhere offer.

So the decision was made to go to the BOG.<sup>1</sup> This was a first. The Board up to now had just discussion, statements, but now the Board was obliged to sit quietly and get the presentation of what was the situation in a particular state. First time in the years since the Agency existed. It's more usual now because there's a precedent.

They were presented with a report of the findings, and the disagreements the Agency found with the declaration and verification findings. They made a presentation of the satellite imagery that existed at the time over the issues that they'd discovered. The BOG was taken through the images showing the waste area, then it was covered by grass, by earth, put some trees on it and changed completely the whole scheme, the picture of the surroundings. So that was enough for the BOG – to approve the request for a Special Inspection.

The things they did not comply with – they were getting really bad until 1994, when Carter went over there, negotiated an agreement, with Robert Galluci again, the terms for the agreed framework. In the meantime, Blix asked me to move over to take the Division of Operations with Japan, so I changed posts, resigned from the Action Team, went to Ops A and DPRK - now it's my basic problem.

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<sup>1</sup> BOG Board of Governors