

The Path towards Strengthened Safeguards: Experiences in Iraq, South Africa, and North Korea

This video series is a collection of dialogues centered on the immense role played by the IAEA, and in particular how the Agency supports nuclear nonproliferation through the practice of safeguards. This current update is a chronicle of events during the 1990s, Iraq, South Africa, and North Korea, that led to the development of the Additional Protocol.

7.18 Hexapartite Safeguards for Enrichment Plants

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Demetrius: But unfortunately that was not my only problem. We'd formed a negotiating team for resolving issues. I was involved in 1985, negotiating the Hexapartite project, with the UK, Netherlands, URENCO countries, the US, they were involved with Euratom and the Agency, in order to formulate an approach for an enrichment plant which would be palatable. This has a history. When you started under Euratom, they put the CSAs into force, one of the points that came up was Almelo [the enrichment plant in The Netherlands]— you have to see how we're going to do things. It was Ken Sanders from US Department of Energy, he was here working for me as an inspector – ok, we'll go to the enrichment plant. We will say, "We want to enter." They say you cannot enter. All hell breaks loose. How are we going to continue?

To go outside [of the facility] is fine, but you can't provide any assurances of non diversion or no higher enrichment. So the Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP) was formed, a number of years going around the world, Japan was also involved, Australia also, - it was Urenco 3, Japan, Australia, US, Agency & Euratom. So finally we had an agreement on the HSP, but because we had this agreement now we had to implement it. Von Beckman, then he left and I took it over.